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From outsiders to insiders? Strategies and practices of American film 
distributors in post-war Italy 
  
This article examines the impact of structural changes in the post-war film 
industry on the activities and effectiveness of the foreign distribution 
subsidiaries of American firms. As these subsidiaries saw their regular supply of 
films from their in-house Hollywood studios decline, they sought out alternative 
sources of product content, often from local markets. Unable to rely on the 
traditional ‘ownership’ advantages bestowed on them by their parent firms, 
these subsidiaries increasingly needed to integrate into local networks and forge 
closer relationships with local producers and exhibitors. Our focus is on Italy, 
one of the most important film markets for US companies in the 1960s. We 
collect data on the box-office revenues and screen time allocated to every film 
released into the 1st run cinema market, and compare the effectiveness of 
American versus Italian distributors in maximising the exposure of their most 
popular films. We explore the attempts by US firms to form partnerships with 
Italian distributors and producers. Finally, we examine available archival records 
to reveal the detailed activities of US distribution offices in Italy, and their 
attempts to integrate into local business networks. We conclude that while US 
subsidiaries did not fully succeed in becoming ‘insiders’ within the Italian film 
industry in this period, they did actively work toward such an objective. 
  
Keywords: Business history; international business; subsidiary firms; liability of 
outsidership; motion picture industry; film distribution. 
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From outsiders to insiders? Strategies and practices of American film 
distributors in post-war Italy 
 
The question of how the foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms overcome the 
challenges of doing business abroad remains an important question for theorists 
and historians of international business.1 Do these subsidiaries rely on the 
‘ownership advantages’ of their corporate parents to surmount their inherent 
foreignness; or do they seek to lessen (or disguise) their foreignness by 
becoming more deeply embedded in the local business environment? Do we find 
subsidiaries shifting from one strategy to the other as the competitive 
environment changes over time? This article focuses on the foreign distribution 
subsidiaries of major American film companies following the collapse of the so-
called Hollywood studio system. The period was one which saw international 
distribution become increasingly important for US firms, yet the traditional 
advantage on which these foreign subsidiaries had relied (exclusive access to the 
output of in-house Hollywood film studios) was unravelling. How did foreign 
distribution subsidiaries respond to this situation? 
 
The demise of the Hollywood studio system and the structural disintegration of 
the film industry in the 1950s and 1960s has attracted the interest of scholars 
from various academic disciplines. The industry has provided a case study of the 
shift from a classical ‘Fordist’ system of mass-production, in which manufacture, 
distribution and exhibition of films was controlled by an oligopoly of vertically 
integrated firms, to one based on flexible networks of small specialist firms who 
combined to produce and market individual films on a project-by-project basis.2 
Whether this evolution involved the crossing of an ‘industrial divide’ has been a 
matter of contention, but its implications have been widely analysed and 
discussed.3 Economic geographers have examined the location of production 
activities, emphasising the continued dominance of the industrial cluster centred 
on Hollywood, while identifying concentrations of specialist firms elsewhere in 
pre- or post-production services and activities.4 Economic historians have 
explored how film producers responded to the increasing levels of uncertainty in 
the post-war era, developing new strategies for the management of risk.5 
Organisation theorists have identified the ‘New Hollywood’ as one of the most 
visible illustrations of the changing nature of the workplace, seeing the film 
industry as an exemplar of the emerging creative economy.6 Historians of 
international business, however, have had relatively little to say about the film 
industry in the post-war decades, even though the period was one in which 
foreign markets grew in significance for the leading American firms.7 
                                                        
1 Recent works include Bhanji and Oxley, “Overcoming the dual liability of foreignness and 
privateness”; Baik, Kang, Kim and Lee. “Liability of foreignness in international equity 
investments”; Lubinski, “Liability of foreignness in historical context”. 
2 Storper, “The transition to flexible specialisation”; Storper and Christopherson, “Flexible 
specialisation”. 
3 Askoy and Robins, “Hollywood for the 21st century”; Storper, “A response”; Robins, 
“Organization as strategy”. 
4 Scott, “A new map of Hollywood”; Scott, “Hollywood and the world”; Scott, On Hollywood. 
5 Sedgwick and Pokorny, “The risk environment of film making”; De Vany, Hollywood Economics. 
6 Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class; Howkins, The Creative Economy;  
7 Guback, The International Film Industry; Waterman, Hollywood’s Road to Riches. 
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At one level, this is understandable. Far from discovering the emergence of a new 
post-industrial era, historians of multinational enterprise point to the 1950s and 
1960s as period in which FDI flows were dominated by large American 
manufacturing firms.8 As far as the growth of international business was 
concerned, the post-war decades look like the highpoint of the integrated 
Chandlerian firm. Even within the film industry it appeared, on the surface at 
least, as though the functioning of international firms remained largely 
unchanged in the post-war decades. The distribution arms of the major US film 
companies built global networks of subsidiaries in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
these remained largely intact throughout the 20th century.9 A closer 
examination of international film distribution in this period, however, reveals a 
more complex (and perhaps a more interesting) picture. While the presence of 
US-owned film distributors in international markets may not have changed very 
much in the 1950s and 60s, the functions performed by these subsidiaries, and 
the resources on which they depended, did begin to evolve very significantly. 
The break-up of vertical structures in the industry did, in fact, have very serious 
implications for the distribution subsidiaries of US firms, creating incentives for 
those subsidiaries to become more deeply embedded in their local markets. 
 
The idea that foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms might need to be closely 
integrated into local business communities as well as the organisational network 
of their parent firm, is now well established within international business (IB) 
theory, though this was not always the case.10 The foundations of modern IB 
theory stem, at least in part, from attempts to understand the unprecedented 
growth of FDI flows from the United States to Western Europe in the post-war 
decades (which could not be explained by existing theories of capital 
investment).11 The emerging theory emphasised a clear distinction between 
‘direct’ and ‘portfolio’ investments, with the former serving as the basis for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) that owned and controlled value-adding 
activities in more than one country.12 Central to the new theory was the 
knowledge-base and strategic intent of parent firms. Thus FDI occurred when: 
firms were in possession of some particularly valuable knowledge, skills or 
resources; when they were able to identify a strategic opportunity to exploit this 
knowledge or resource in a particular foreign location; and finally when it was 
more beneficial to exploit these advantages through internal expansion than 
through licencing to local agents.13 The theory, which was developed and refined 
through the 1970s and 1980s, provided a logical explanation for global patterns 
of FDI in the second half of the twentieth century, but left little room for the 
agency of subsidiary firms. Theorists did recognise that foreign subsidiaries 
                                                        
8 Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise; Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism. 
9 Thompson, Exporting Entertainment; Gomery, Hollywood Studio System. 
10 For a recent overview of the IB literature see Rugman et al. “Fifty years of international 
business theory”. 
11 Kindleberger, American Business Abroad; Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay; Wilkins, Maturing of 
Multinational Enterprise. 
12 Hymer, The International Operations of National Firms. 
13 These three factors formed the basis of the so-called eclectic paradigm. See Dunning, “Trade, 
location of economic activity and the MNEs”; Dunning, “The eclectic paradigm of international 
production”. 
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faced real challenges in competing against local rivals. Indeed, it was precisely 
because these subsidiaries faced a ‘liability of foreignness’ that they needed to 
posses a clear advantage over local rivals to remain competitive.14 Thus the key 
to success for foreign subsidiary companies (in early IB theory at least) was their 
ability to draw on the superior knowledge and resources of their parent firms. A 
subsidiary firm’s embeddedness within the systems and structures of its parent 
firm may have made it ‘foreign’, but it also provided the necessary advantages to 
overcome this liability. Conceived this way, the ‘foreignness’ of overseas 
subsidiaries is unchanging, and their ability to integrate into local networks or 
acquire local knowledge is largely irrelevant. They live or die by the value of the 
firm-specific advantages bestowed by their parents. Such a view is not difficult to 
reconcile with the notion of MNEs as institutions that wield immense market 
power, and that the rapid expansion of US multinationals after 1945 marked the 
emergence of American hegemony.15 
 
In recent decades historians interested in the idea of Americanisation, have 
sought to distance themselves from concepts such as American hegemony, 
preferring instead to highlight the role of local actors in (selectively) adopting 
American ideas and adapting them to particular local or national contexts.16 
Similarly the IB literature, since the mid-1980s, has focussed increasing attention 
on the activities of subsidiary firms in adapting the knowledge and resources of 
their parents to local market needs.17 Scholars began to see the balance of global 
integration and local responsiveness as a key strategic challenge facing 
multinational firms.18 By the turn of the century, IB theorists were beginning to 
speak of ‘competence creating subsidiaries’, and it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that the success of foreign affiliates could be determined not just by 
their access to the firm-specific advantages of their parents, but also their 
integration into local business communities and access to local, market-specific 
knowledge.19 IB theorists now refer to the dual (or multiple) embeddedness of 
subsidiary firms.20 
 
Alongside this re-assessment of the role of subsidiary companies, IB scholars 
have also sought to re-evaluate the concept of liability of foreignness.21 If 
subsidiaries can, over time, become embedded within local business networks 
                                                        
14 Hymer, International Operations of National Firms; Zaheer, “Overcoming the liability of 
foreignness”. 
15 Stephen Hymer did in fact hold such a view, believing that MNEs were able to possess 
something close to monopoly power in foreign markets. 
16 Zeitlin, Herrigel, Americanization and its Limits; Kipping, Bjarnar, The Americanisation of 
European Business; Djelic, Exporting the American Model; Bonin, de Goey, American Firms in 
Europe; Kuisel, Seducing the French; Kuisel, “Americanization for historians”. 
17 Bartlett, Ghoshal, “Tap your subsidiaries for global reach”; Hedlund, “The hypermodern MNC”; 
Abo, Hybrid Factory. 
18 Prahalad, Doz, The Multinational Mission; Bartlett, Ghoshal, Managing Across Borders. 
19 Birkinshaw, Hood, “Multinational subsidiary evolution”; Birkinshaw et al., “Building firm 
specific advantages”; Mudambi, Navarra, “Is knowledge power?”; Cantwell, Mudambi, “MNE 
competence-creating subsidiary mandates”. 
20 Meyer et al., “Multinational enterprises and local contexts”; Narula, “Exploring the paradox of 
competence-creating subsidiaries”.  
21 Zaheer, “Overcoming the liability of foreignness”; Zaheer, Mosakowski, “The dynamics of the 
liability of foreignness”; Mezias, “Identifying liabilities of foreignness”. 
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does this mean that they are able to become less ‘foreign’? Are firms from some 
countries more ‘foreign’ than others? Recent historical scholarship shows that in 
a given host market, foreign subsidiaries from different home countries could 
face very different challenges, with their country-of-origin viewed in either 
positive or negative terms, and that this was subject to change over time.22 
Recently, IB theorists have helpfully started to conceptualise the challenge of 
doing business overseas less as a liability of foreignness than of ‘outsidership’.23 
Foreignness is a relatively crude and simplistic concept when examining 
subsidiary firms, as well as being something outside of their direct control.24 The 
extent to which subsidiaries are able to behave as insiders within a given foreign 
market, on the other hand, is potentially much more varied and complex. The 
conceptualisation around outsidership/insidership  is helpful to our 
understanding of subsidiaries as multi-embedded enterprises. A subsidiary’s 
embeddedness within its parent firm may enable it to overcome a liability of 
foreignness (as traditional IB theory explains), but if it becomes embedded in 
local business networks does its position begin to evolve from that of an outsider 
to one of increasing insidership? What are the circumstances under which 
subsidiary firms would be motivated to strive for insider status within a foreign 
market? How does such a process play out in practice? 
 
The structural changes within the post-war film industry provide an excellent 
context in which to explore such questions. Here we have a case in which the 
foreign subsidiaries of US multinationals were incentivised to move from a 
system of single to multiple-embeddedness. We do not regard this to have been a 
natural or inevitable evolution, but rather the result of a very specific set of 
historical circumstances. This article explains the reason for this shift, and 
reveals some of the mechanisms by which subsidiaries sought to enhance their 
insider status. After outlining how the break-up of the studio system affected the 
basic structure of international film distribution, attention is focussed on Italy, 
which was an important cinema market for at least two reasons. First, compared 
to markets such as the US, UK or Germany, competition from television and other 
leisure activities had a much smaller impact on cinema attendance in Italy in the 
1950s and 60s.25 While other national markets were in rapid decline the Italian 
film market continued to grow, becoming an increasingly important source of 
revenue for US distributors.26 Second, the period witnessed a resurgence in 
creativity within the Italian film industry, and something of a boom in domestic 
film production.27 Here, then, we have one of Hollywood’s largest foreign 
markets, but also a vibrant domestic film industry where US distributors faced 
no shortage of local competition.  
 
We draw on both quantitative and qualitative data to make our case. Our most 
important source of statistical evidence is a newly constructed dataset, based on 
                                                        
22 Lubinski, “Liability of foreignness in historical context”. 
23 Johanson, Vahlne, “The Uppsala Internationalisation process model revisited”. 
24 Stevens, Shenkar, “The liability of home”. 
25 Forbes, Street, European Cinema, p. 21. 
26 Quaglietti, Il cinema Italiano nel dopoguerra; Brunetta, “The long march of American cinema in 
Italy”. 
27 Bondanella, Italian Cinema; Brunetta, The History of Italian Cinema. 
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information held in the Borsa Film, an official trade publication – sponsored by 
the national association of exhibitors – which contains details of the box office 
revenues generated by, and the screen time allocated to, every film released into 
the Italian first-run market between cinema seasons 1957-8 and 1970-1. Borsa 
also records the distributor of each film, as well as its director and leading actors. 
To this data we have added information on the producers of each film, drawn 
from the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). The creation of this dataset enables us 
to assess the performance of different film distributors in Italy. Specifically, it 
allows us to compare the effectiveness of American and Italian distributors, as 
well as that of Italian-American joint ventures, in terms of their ability to 
maximise the screen time allocated to their most popular films. Was it the case, 
for example, that local distributors were able to secure more exposure for their 
films in prime cinema locations than foreign rivals? The quantitative data, in 
other words, allows us to measure the liability of outsidership faced by US 
subsidiaries, and whether the formation of local joint ventures helped to 
overcome this. The statistical evidence, however, can only take us so far. It 
indicates that while US firms may have had incentives to engage in local 
distribution partnerships, the advantages of such partnerships for Italian 
companies were much less apparent. Very few distribution joint ventures were 
actually sustained for more than a few years. For US-owned subsidiaries in Italy, 
if insidership could not be achieved through the creation of local partnerships it 
would need to be built up through the knowledge and connections of local 
managers. To examine how this was attempted we turn to the archives of one of 
the leading US distributors, Warner Bros. We scrutinise the records of Warner’s 
Italian distribution subsidiary, and its correspondence with the corporate head 
office, to uncover the activities, contacts and relationships being pursued by the 
firm’s Italian management. Having twice tried (and failed) in the early 1960s to 
form distribution partnerships with local firms, how did this particular American 
subsidiary company seek to enhance its insider status in the Italian market? 
 
US film distributors and their international markets 
US film companies could make a stronger claim than most multinationals to the 
status of truly global organisations in the mid-twentieth century. Writing in the 
Harvard Business Review in 1930 William Victor Strauss confidently declared 
that “there are few American industries that are more dependent upon foreign 
markets than the motion picture industry; and there are still fewer industries in 
which American dominance of world markets has, in the past, been more 
dramatic and complete.”28 In the period covered here markets outside of the US 
and Canada typically accounted for well over half of total sales, with the majority 
of this foreign revenue coming from Europe.29  The influence of Hollywood in 
Europe is a topic that has attracted much attention from historians, although the 
influence of Europe on the strategy and practices of US films distributors is less 
well understood.30 Studies of cinema audiences and the reception of films in 
Europe have pointed to the popularity of domestic films, and argued that the 
                                                        
28 Strauss, “Foreign Distribution of American Motion Pictures”. 
29 Guback, The International Film Industry, 3. 
30 Ellwood, Kroes, Hollywood in Europe; Saunders, Hollywood in Berlin; Higson, Maltby, “Film 
Europe” and “Film America”; de Grazia, “Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge 
to European Cinemas, 1920-1960”. 
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Hollywood films with the greatest appeal were usually those with themes or 
stars to whom domestic audiences could most easily relate.31 Such research 
suggests that US film distributors would have had a clear incentive to adapt their 
film portfolios to the particular preferences of their main international markets, 
yet little work has been done to examine whether the subsidiaries of US film 
multinationals did in fact attempt to do this.32 Much of the existing work which 
does look at Hollywood and its foreign markets, focuses extensively on film 
policy, and in particular on the role of the Motion Picture Export Association 
(MPEA) in pressuring foreign governments to ease restrictions on the imports of 
American films.33 While this work demonstrates that the MPEA, and its 
predecessor the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), 
did undeniably play an important role in facilitating the export of Hollywood 
entertainment, there is a danger that by overemphasising their role in shaping 
film policy we too easily begin to treat “Hollywood” as a homogenous entity, 
whose primary function was to support US foreign policy objectives. From the 
perspective of IB theory, this literature focuses almost exclusively on the 
country-specific advantages enjoyed by US companies, but fails to explore their 
firm-specific characteristics. The major US film companies did indeed collaborate 
under the banner of the MPEA in order to press for common political objectives, 
but when it came to managing their business operations in specific markets, the 
firms were competitors and often pursued quite distinct business strategies.34 
This article focuses attention not just at the firm level, but at that of the foreign 
subsidiary. Before examining the activities and performance of subsidiary firms, 
however, we should introduce their parents. 
 
The transformation of the US film industry in the 1950s and 1960s was triggered 
by declining cinema audiences in the face of competition from television, and the 
requirement that firms sell-off their domestic cinema chains in compliance with 
anti-trust legislation in the form of the Paramount decree of 1948.35 The period 
witnessed the disintegration of industry structures, with the so-called major 
‘studios’ relinquishing direct ownership and control over both cinema exhibition, 
and the vast majority of Hollywood film production.36 Yet as far as film 
distribution was concerned, continuity was at least as evident as change.37 With 
the exception of RKO, which withdrew from film production and distribution in 
1957, the oligopoly of US firms which had emerged to dominate global film 
distribution in the 1920s remained intact. 38 During the 1930s and 1940s a 
                                                        
31 Garncarz, “Hollywood in Germany: the role of American films in Germany, 1925-1990”, in 
Hollywood in Europe, eds. Ellwood, Kroes, 107-9; Glancy, When Hollywood Loved Britain; Stokes, 
Maltby, Hollywood Abroad; Fanchi, Mosconi, Forme di consumo; Casetti, Mosconi, Riti e ambienti; 
Spinazzola, Cinema e pubblico.  
32 The best available study of the foreign distribution activities of US film companies remains 
Thompson, Exporting Entertainment, but this focuses primarily on the silent era. 
33 Trumpbour, Selling Hollywood to the World; Jarvie, Hollywood’s Overseas Campaign; Swann, 
“The Little State Department” in Hollywood in Europe, eds. Ellwood, Kroes; Segrave, American 
Films Abroad. 
34 Miskell, “Resolving the Global Efficiency Versus Local Adaptability Dilemma”; Sedgwick et al., 
“Hollywood in the World Market”. 
35 For a summary see Casper, Postwar Hollywood. 
36 Storper, “The Transition to Flexible Specialisation”. 
37 Aksoy, Robins, “Hollywood for the 21st Century”. 
38 Jewell, RKO Radio Pictures; Lasky, RKO. 
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distinction could be drawn between the ‘big five’ film companies (MGM, 
Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Bros. and RKO), and the ‘little three’ 
(Universal, Columbia and United Artists).39 The former group were characterised 
by their ownership of large domestic cinema chains in the US, and their extensive 
film production activities (typically 40-60 feature films per year). The ‘little 
three’ did not operate cinema chains, and if they engaged in film production at 
all, did so on a less ambitious scale than the larger vertically integrated firms.40 
By the 1960s the distinction between ‘big five’ and ‘little three’ had largely 
dissolved. Film distribution (rather than production or exhibition) was now the 
primary activity of all the major firms. The post-war decades saw Universal, 
Columbia and United Artists grow in prominence, while the once mighty MGM 
(the leading film producer of the 1930s and 1940s) saw its market position 
gradually decline. 
 
Each of these companies had built up an extensive global network of distribution 
offices in the 1920s and 1930s.41 While subsidiaries based in territories 
controlled by the axis powers were forced to close during the Second World War, 
the majority of these offices were re-opened soon after the end of hostilities, and 
by the mid-1950s the international reach of these distribution companies was 
wider than ever.42 The period under examination here was not one in which US 
film companies were expanding abroad for the first time. These were 
multinational enterprises with several decades of experience operating in 
overseas markets. In Europe, the key challenge they faced was not one of market 
entry, but of how to maintain competitiveness in diverse and rapidly evolving 
market environments. During the so-called studio era the task of distribution 
subsidiaries of the major US firms had essentially been to handle the local 
release of its parent’s films. Ownership of the intellectual property rights to these 
pictures constituted the primary ‘advantage’ on which these subsidiaries traded. 
Moreover, the volume of films that US distribution subsidiaries were able to offer 
was highly valued by local exhibitors, particularly in second and third run 
markets, who required a high quantity of product (due to their practice of 
screening double-feature programmes which were typically replaced on a twice 
weekly basis).43 As vertical structures within the industry began to disintegrate, 
however, the supply of ‘in-house’ product began to run dry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 Gomery, The Hollywood Studio System. 
40 Columbia and Universal were both producer-distributors, but United Artists specialised in film 
distribution only. Balio, United Artists. 
41 Thompson, Exporting Entertainment. 
42 The numbers of international distribution offices operated by each of these firms was recorded 
annually in the Film Daily Yearbook. 
43 Sedgwick et al. “Hollywood in the world market”. 
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Table 1: Films in which MGM and Warner Bros. owned world-wide distribution 
rights, 1951-63 
 MGM Warner Bros. Combined 
 Studio 
production 
Outside 
producer 
Studio 
production 
Outside 
producer 
All film 
releases 
% studio 
productions 
1951/2 41 0 20 7 68 90 
1952/3 46 0 20 6 72 92 
1953/4 28 0 14 11 53 79 
1954/5 24 0 7 12 43 72 
1955/6 20 3 12 12 47 68 
1956/7 21 10 10 11 52 60 
1957/8 10 22 9 17 58 47 
1958/9 15 9 7 9 40 55 
1959/60 15 5 7 11 38 58 
1960/1 11 4 7 6 28 64 
1961/2 10 6 8 8 32 56 
1962/3 3 7 5 7 22 36 
Source: For MGM, the Eddie Mannix ledger, held at the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of 
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences; for Warner Bros., the William Schaefer ledger, held at the 
University of Southern California Film and Television Archives, Los Angeles. 
 
The 1950s saw major film companies like MGM and Warner Bros. significantly 
reduce their volume of studio production. The distribution arms of these firms 
were thus required to source content from outside producers to make up some 
of this shortfall. By the 1960s it was clear that not only were the total number of 
films being released by leading US distributors in decline, but these distributors 
were increasingly reliant on external sources of supply. For the foreign 
distribution subsidiaries of US firms, this meant their long-standing source of 
competitive advantage (exclusive rights to the films of their in-house Hollywood 
studio) was beginning to look precarious. Even if the rights to distribute a certain 
proportion of independently produced Hollywood films could be secured, their 
supply of American films remained on a downward trajectory. 
 
Fig. 1a: Film distribution in the studio era 
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Fig. 1b: Film distribution in the post studio era 
 
Increasingly, foreign distribution offices of US firms were required to source 
local content to meet the needs of local audiences. Nowhere was this more 
apparent than in Italy. 
 
The market for film in 1960s Italy 
Between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s Italy’s economy grew by an average 
of 5.6 per cent each year – a faster rate of growth than (almost) any other 
European country.44 This so-called economic miracle enabled Italy to effectively 
catch-up with the most advanced industrial economies.45 Investment in US-style 
mass-production technologies under the Marshall Plan, and the opening up of 
intra-European trade within the European Economic Community (of which Italy 
was a founding member) opened up opportunities for export-led growth.46 The 
system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls agreed at Bretton Woods 
meant that the Lire remained highly competitive and the export-led boom could 
be sustained, which in turn encouraged further investment in technology and 
improved productivity.47 Italy was thus able to take maximum economic 
advantage of comparatively low labour costs as well as cheap energy. Growth 
was most pronounced in industrial sectors such as engineering, chemicals and 
                                                        
44 Colli, “Investing in a Developing Economy”, in American Firms in Europe, eds. Bonin, de Goey, 
140; Petri, Storia economica d’Italia; Barca, Storia del capitalismo italiano; Pellegrini, “Lo sviluppo 
strutturale dell’economia italiana”, in Storia economica d’Italia, eds. Ciocca and Toniolo; Crainz, 
Storia del miracolo italiano. Culture, identità, trasformazioni fra anni cinquanta e sessanta; ID., Il 
paese mancato. Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta; Castronovo, Storia economica d’Italia. 
Dall’Ottocento ai giorni nostri, 410-17; Van der Wee, L’economia mondiale tra crisi e benessere 
(1945-1980); Lanaro, Storia dell’Italia repubblicana; Bocca, Miracolo all’italiana; Gorgolini, L’Italia 
in movimento. Storia sociale degli anni Cinquanta; Morcellini, De Nardis, Società  industria 
culturale in Italia; Cardini, Il miracolo economico italiano 1958-1963; Foot, Milano dopo il 
miracolo: biografia di una città; Castronovo, L’Italia del miracolo economico; Belcampo, L'Italia 
entra nel miracolo economico in bicicletta e ne esce in automobile; Balduini, Miracoli e boom. 
L’Italia dal dopoguerra al boom economico nell’opera di Cesare Zavattini; Mafai, Il sorpasso: gli 
straordinari anni del miracolo economico 1958-1963. 
45 Felice, Vecchi, “Italy’s Modern Economic Growth”. 
46 Pistoresi, Rinaldi, “Exports, Imports and Growth”. 
47 Barbiellini Amidei, Cantwell and Spadavecchia, “Innovation and Foreign Technology”. 
11 
 
metals, often led by State-owned organisations, with relatively few large-scale 
private enterprises (such as auto-maker Fiat) coming to the fore.48 The fruits of 
Italy’s rapidly expanding GDP were not lost on workers and consumers. Net 
national income almost doubled in real terms from around 17,000 billion Lire in 
the mid-1950s to 30,000 billion in the mid-1960s. The same period saw net 
income per capita grow from 350,000 to 571,000 Lire. Agricultural employment 
dropped while employees in manufacturing industries rose from 32 to 40% and 
in the service sector from 28 to 35%.49 An increasingly affluent industrial 
workforce found itself with more money to spend, and a greater range of 
consumption choices in their leisure time. Activities such as Sunday trips in the 
iconic Fiat 500 became not just possible, but widely popular. One contemporary 
novelist was able to write of the early 1960s as an “unexpected belle époque”,50 
while later historians have charted a process in which Italians adopted the 
“models and myths of capitalistic consumerism”.51 Cinematically, these 
developments were captured in films such as Fellini’s La Dolce Vita / The Sweet 
Life (1960), as well as a range of comedies which drew on the rapidly evolving 
social and economic landscape as a source of humour.52 
 
Notwithstanding the advent of TV broadcasting,53 in Italy, unlike many other 
European economies, the cinema industry was a beneficiary of this economic 
growth.54 Whereas rates of cinema attendance (and numbers of cinemas) were 
in steep decline in the US, UK and Germany by the 1960s, the Italian market 
remained remarkably buoyant.55 Cinema-going as a social activity had become 
deeply embedded in cities such as Rome in the 1950s,56 and it continued to exert 
a strong appeal throughout the 1960s, especially among younger audiences.57 
The peak year for film admissions in Italy was 1955 (compared to 1946 in both 
the US and the UK), and attendances did not drop back down to their 1950 level 
until 1966. The number of cinemas remained fairly stable from the late 1950s 
through the 1960s at around 11,000 to 12,000.58 The total number of screening 
days at Italian cinemas grew throughout the 1950s (peaking in 1962), and screen 
                                                        
48 Felice, Vecchi, “Italy’s Modern Economic Growth”. 
49 Istat, Sommario di statistiche storiche 1926-1985, 153; D’Apice, L’arcipelago dei consumi. 
Consumi e redditi delle famigle in Italia dal dopoguerra ad oggi, 103.Figures are computed at 1963 
constant prices.  
50 Calvino, “La belle époque inattesa”, in Tempi moderni, July-September 1961, 26. 
51 Gundle, Communism and Cultural Change in Postwar Italy; ID., “L’americanizzazione del 
quotidiano. Televisione e consumismo nell’Italia degli anni Cinquanta”. 
52 Brunetta, The History of Italian Cinema; Lanzoni, Comedy Italian Style. 
53 Grasso, Storia della televisione italiana. 
54 Gennari, Post-War Italian Cinema, 6-8; Brunetta, Storia del cinema italiano, Vol. 3, 6-12; Corsi, 
Con qualche dollaro in meno, 37-42. Luzzatto Fegiz, Il volto sconosciuto dell’Italia, 21; Diena, Gli 
uomini e le masse, 88.  
55 Lev, The Euro-American Cinema, 18-19; Williams, European Media Studies, 81-2; Canosa, “Il 
nostro cinema alla riscossa” and “I film difficili fanno cassetta”, both in Il Giorno, respectively 
November 28, 1959 and November 7, 1960.  Bianchi, “Non è effimera l’espansione del nostro 
cinema”, in Il Giorno, December 31st 1961. 
56 Gennari, Sedgwick, “Memories in Context”. 
57 Luzzatto Fegiz, Il volto sconosciuto.  
58 This figure refers to commercial cinemas only. According to a detailed MPAA report there were 
11,148 ‘motion picture theatres’ in Italy in 1957, as well as 5,955 parish halls that were also used 
for screening films. A. Manson, “Survey of the Italian Motion Picture Market”, October 1958, Box 
16520A, Warner Bros. Archive [WBA hereafter]. See also Wagstaff, Italian Neorealist Cinema, 417. 
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days remained 20 per cent higher in 1971 than they had been in 1950. The 
enduring appeal of cinema entertainment, combined with admission prices that 
rose faster than the rate of inflation, meant that box office revenues continued to 
grow throughout the period. At current prices, expenditure on cinema 
entertainment grew by 87 per cent between 1958 and 1971. At constant prices 
the figure stands at 19 per cent. 
 
Table 2: Cinema admissions, expenditures and screening days in Italy, 1950-1971 
Year Total 
screening 
days 
No. of 
tickets 
sold 
(000s) 
Average 
price 
(lire) 
Expenditure 
(lire 000s) 
Expenditure 
(lire 000s) 
    Nominal At 1957 
prices 
1950 1,509,020 661,549 96 63,404,220 83,503,358 
1951 1,616,137 705,666 104 73,203,418 87,917,305 
1952 1,735,715 748,099 112 83,672,172 96,390,342 
1953 1,844,546 777,910 121 94,501,722 106,786,946 
1954 1,927,345 800,733 131 105,172,148 115,689,363 
1955 2,009,362 819,424 142 116,690,729 124,859,080 
1956 2,039,734 790,153 147 116,021,155 118,225,557 
1957 2,028,827 758,364 149 112,780,786 112,780,786 
1958 2,029,532 730,412 152 110,774,095 105,700,472 
1959 2,039,337 747,904 156 116,639,557 111,723,714 
1960 2,037,144 744,781 162 120,986,712 112,966,118 
1961 2,070,096 741,019 170 125,650,146 113,916,723 
1962 2,075,573 728,572 182 132,470,984 114,297,657 
1963 2,035,169 697,480 201 140,517,638 111,877,100 
1964 2,058,942 682,985 221 151,099,011 114,468,948 
1965 2,031,672 663,080 240 159,079,787 115,526,352 
1966 2,001,438 631,957 262 165,305,675 117,655,285 
1967 1,929,429 568,926 289 164,265,188 114,630,278 
1968 1,881,569 559,933 305 170,617,802 117,586,356 
1969 1,868,308 550,884 325 179,209,690 120,113,733 
1970 1,831,793 525,006 346 181,896,364 116,005,334 
1971 1,814,272 535,733 386 206,814,843 125,646,928 
Source:  "Lo Spettacolo in Italia", Società Italiana Autori Editori (SIAE) Roma, annual publication. 
 
As well as being a growing market, Italy was also a relatively unrestricted one for 
American film distributors.59 The Italian-American Film Agreement, originally 
signed in 1951,60 did place a limit on the number of American pictures that US 
distributors could release annually in Italy, but the figure was set at a sufficiently 
high level that the major US companies were not prevented from handling the 
distribution of their own productions in Italy. There was no limit imposed on the 
number of American films that could be released by Italian distributors. In 1962 
the film quota was dropped entirely, leading the American trade press to report 
                                                        
59 Gennari, Post-War Italian Cinema. 
60 ANICA, Venti anni dell’ANICA, 12-14; Quaglietti, Storia economico-politica. 
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that “according to the [Motion Picture Export] Association, the new agreement 
assures virtually a free market for United States films in Italy.”61 
 
These trends meant that Italy became an increasingly important market for the 
major US film distributors in the post-war decades. In the 1930s and 1940s the 
UK dwarfed all other foreign markets as far as the Hollywood studios were 
concerned, with around half of all foreign revenues derived from there.62 By the 
early 1960s Italy was not only Hollywood’s largest non-English language foreign 
market, it was almost equal to the British one in terms of the revenues it 
generated for US distributors.63 
 
If the Italian market became an increasingly attractive location for US film 
companies in the 1960s, it was also one that was becoming increasingly 
competitive. As Hollywood studios scaled back production in response to 
declining audiences at home and in other parts of the English speaking world, 
Italian film production blossomed.64 In 1958 the output of Italian film production 
companies was 141 pictures, but by 1972 (the peak year) this figure had doubled 
to 280. This contrasted with a decline in the numbers of American films being 
distributed in Italy from 233 in 1958 to 127 in 1967.65 Film historians tend to 
agree that it was not just the volume of Italian film production that was 
increasing in this period, but also its quality.66 Directors such as Rossellini, 
Fellini, Di Sica, Visconti and Leone attracted international acclaim while stars 
such as Sophia Loren and Marcello Mastroianni achieved success in both Europe 
and America.67 While film-makers of the immediate post-war years had achieved 
international critical acclaim for neo-realist classics such as Roma Citta Aperta / 
Rome, Open City (1945) and Ladri di Biciclette / Bicycle Thieves (1948), by the 
mid-1950s the focus of Italian cinema had shifted from ‘films of the people’ to 
‘films for the people.’ The 1960s witnessed the emergence of popular genres 
such as the spaghetti western, which appealed to international audiences as well 
as domestic ones, as well as the establishment of a lasting tradition of commedia 
all’italiana which provided the basis for some of the best loved films of the day 
and has remained popular in Italy ever since.68 As Peter Bondanella argues, “the 
decade between 1958 and 1968 may in retrospect be accurately described as the 
golden age of Italian cinema, for in no other single period was its artistic quality, 
                                                        
61 Film Daily Yearbook (January 1963): 590. 
62 Miskell, “’Selling America to the World’?” 
63 Aggregated data from four of the leading US distributors (Warner Bros., MGM, Paramount and 
Universal) show that Italy contributed13 per cent of foreign revenue in 1961, while the UK and 
Ireland contributed 14 percent. The next most important markets were Germany (11%), France 
(7%) and Japan (6%). Warner Bros. Archives [WBA hereafter], USC School of Cinematic Arts, Box 
13116B, ‘Comparison film billings’, and Box 16591B, ‘O’Sullivan miscellaneous – schedules of 
cost’. 
64 Brunetta, Storia del cinema italiano. 
65 Bondanella, Italian Cinema, 142-144. 
66 Nowell-Smith, Making Waves, 152-162; Wood, Italian Cinema, 14-21; Sorlin, Italian National 
Cinema, 115-143. 
67 Small, Sophia Loren; Reich, Beyond the Latin Lover; Burke, Valler, Federico Fellini; Wagstaff, 
“Italian Genre Films”, in Hollywood and Europe, eds. Nowell-Smith, Ricci, eds., 74-85. 
68 Wagstaff, “A Forkful of Westerns”, in Popular European Cinema, eds. Dyer and Vincendeau;  
D’Amico, La commedia all’italiana; Grande, La commedia all’italiana; Pintus, La commedia 
all'italiana.  
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its international prestige, or its economic strength so consistently high.”69 Gian 
Piero Brunetta identifies the emergence of an “Italian style” in the post-war 
period which “would help to shape international cinema, influencing directors 
like Scorsese, Coppola, Ivory and Campion.”70 The Italian film market may have 
become increasingly important for the major US film distributors by the 1960s, 
but it was a market in which Hollywood films were far from dominant. American 
pictures accounted for over half of all box office revenues in Italy in 1958 (with 
Italian films earning just over 30 per cent of the total). Yet by 1972 the share of 
box office earned by US films had dropped to little more than 15 per cent, while 
Italian productions (or co-productions) held over 60 per cent of the market.71  
 
The figures commonly cited in the secondary literature for the numbers of 
American and Italian films released into the market, and the share of box-office 
revenue they attracted, are consistent with the evidence from our dataset. The 
number of US films released into the first-run market, according to our data, fell 
from 326 in the 1957/8 season to 151 in 1970/71. Italian film releases over the 
same period grew from 140 to 210 per year. Figure 2 illustrates that the 
turnaround in market share held by US and Italian films was evident in first run 
cinema venues as well as the wider market. While our dataset only captures 
information on a proportion of the Italian film market in this period, there are 
good reasons to believe that this was a particularly important sector of the 
market that broadly reflected wider industry trends. 
 
Figure 2: Market share of Italian and US films in the 1st run market, 1957-71
 
Source: Dataset 
 
Did the growth in the share of the market held by Italian films simply reflect the 
increased number of such films being released, or were these domestic 
productions genuinely more popular than Hollywood movies? The question is 
not directly addressed in most surveys of the Italian film industry, yet it is crucial 
                                                        
69 Bondanella, Italian Cinema, 142. 
70 Brunetta, The History of Italian Cinema, 10. 
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if we are to understand the strategies of firms operating within this market. The 
information in our dataset on box-office earnings of each film allows us to 
compare the appeal of US and domestic productions for Italian audiences. (It 
should be noted that any co-productions involving Italian producers are 
classified here as Italian films, and similarly co-productions involving US 
companies are listed as American. There were a small number of US-Italian 
productions released throughout the period which have been classified 
separately. While these do not feature in the charts, they are discussed below.) 
Figure 3 shows that for much of the period under review the popularity of Italian 
and American films was broadly comparable. The shift in the overall share of the 
market towards Italian pictures (and away from Hollywood) was largely 
determined by the numbers of these films being released, rather than any 
decisive change in consumer preference for domestic product. Certainly, we can 
say that the sharp decline in market share held by US films in the late 1950s was 
almost entirely explained by the reduction in the number of Hollywood pictures 
being produced at the tail end of the studio system. Only towards the end of the 
period do we appear to see an emerging preference for Italian films (we are 
unable to say for how long this endured) and this explains the shift in market 
share towards domestic product towards the end of the 1960s. Among the most 
popular American films released in Italy during our period we find a 
preponderance of “sword-and-sandal” epics, such as The Bible / La Bibbla (John 
Huston, 1966), The Ten Commandments / I Dieci Comandamenti (Cecil B DeMille, 
1956), Cleopatra (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1963), and Ben Hur (William Wyler, 
1959). The most popular Italian releases included comedies Matrimonio 
All’Italiana / Marriage Italian Style (Vittorio De Sica, 1965), Per Grazia Ricevata / 
Between Miracles (Nino Manfredi, 1971), and Il Medico della Mutua / Be Sick… It’s 
Free (Luigi Zampa, 1968), as well as Sergio Leone’s Per Qualche Dollaro in Piu / 
For a Few Dollars More (1965) and Il Buono, Il Brutto, Il Cattivo / The Good, The 
Bad and the Ugly (1966). Fellini’s La Dolce Vita / The Sweet Life (1960) was also 
among the ten most popular films released throughout the period. 
 
Figure 3: Average box-office earnings of Italian and American films in the 1st run 
market, 1957-71 
 
Source: Dataset 
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If the popularity of American and Italian films was broadly comparable for most 
of our period, the same cannot be said for the small number of joint US/Italian 
productions released at this time. With only four or five such pictures typically 
released each year (and just one or two in some years) the average earnings of 
these films varied enormously from season to season. For the sixty US/Italian 
film releases throughout the period, however, average box-office revenues 
amounted to 106 million lire in the first run market, more than double the 
average revenues of either US or Italian pictures. Our dataset provides no 
information on the popularity of these films outside Italy, and of course world-
wide revenue (and profit) performance would have been the yardstick by which 
producers judged the success or failure of such films. It is noticeable, however, 
that a number of these films, such Doctor Zhivago (prod. MGM / Carlo Ponti) and 
El Cid (prod. Samuel Bronston / Dear Film) were based on widely recognised 
stories or characters with a broad international appeal.   
 
As far as US film distributors in the Italian market were concerned, we can 
clearly see that incentives existed for them to build and strengthen the local 
component of their product portfolios during this period. The declining numbers 
of US films being produced by the Hollywood studios meant that if they were to 
maintain their share of this growing market, US firms needed to secure 
distribution rights to more Italian pictures. The fact that Italian films were no 
less popular than Hollywood ones (and grew in popularity as the period 
progressed) would only have reinforced this need. Given the increasing reliance 
of US distribution subsidiaries on films made by outside producers, it was 
becoming increasingly important for these firms to demonstrate that they could 
operate as effectively as local competitors in promoting and marketing pictures 
in foreign markets. The distribution subsidiaries of US firms could no longer rely 
on the property rights to their parent company’s films in order to overcome a 
traditional liability of foreignness. Establishing a position of insidership within 
major foreign markets such as Italy became increasingly important, both to 
secure distribution rights to popular local productions, and to maximise the 
screen time allocated to their releases. The information held in our dataset 
allows us to examine the effectiveness of US distributors in both regards. 
 
The system of film distribution and the effectiveness of US and Italian 
distributors 
Commercial film distribution in Italy in the post-war period was organised 
around sixteen cities, which acted as regional distribution centres. Cinema 
venues in each location fitted into a clear hierarchy with larger city centre “first 
run” theatres showing new releases, before films continued their distribution 
through second and third run cinemas. First run cinemas constituted about ten 
per cent of all cinemas in each of the sixteen centres, but as they were typically 
the largest venues charging the highest admission prices, they constituted much 
more than ten per cent of revenues. Moreover, without the marketing platform of 
a first run release, it was much harder for a film to secure bookings in the second 
and third run markets. Film distributors, therefore, had a very strong incentive 
to ensure that as many of their films as possible received a first run release.  
 
17 
 
First run film distribution was clearly very important, but access to the first run 
market was also highly competitive. Not only were first run cinema venues 
relatively few in number, they also tended to book films for longer runs than was 
the case in second or third run halls. The purpose of first run distribution was to 
showcase the most prominent (and popular films) which might attract audiences 
from a broad geographic area, rather than to provide a regular local audience 
with reliable but ever changing stream of entertainment. As such, first run 
cinema venues required a smaller volume of product than second or third run 
halls, which meant that competition between distributors to secure first run 
bookings could be quite intense. In an era when US distributors held exclusive 
access to Hollywood entertainment, and these films faced relatively modest local 
competition, American firms held a powerful position vis-a-vis first run 
exhibitors. As local competition increased, and as their supply of in-house 
product declined, American subsidiaries found themselves needing to work 
much harder to secure prime first-run bookings for their films in the most 
important venues. No longer able to rely on exclusive access to the bulk of the 
most popular films, US distributor’s subsidiaries needed to find ways of 
acquiring rights to popular local films, and of persuading local exhibitors to 
allocate valuable screen time to their releases. In this context the strength of a 
distributor’s connections, and the depth of their relationships with local film 
producers and exhibitors became increasingly important. Previous studies have 
been unable to assess whether some distributors were more successful than 
others in securing access to first run cinema screens in Italy. The information in 
our dataset now makes this possible. 
 
Up to now we have looked at aggregated data for very large numbers of films, 
but it is important to recognise that the distribution of box-office revenues was 
highly uneven, with a small number of ‘hit’ films capturing a large proportion of 
the total market.72 For film distributors what really mattered was not the typical 
performance of their median cinema release, but their ability to maximise the 
earning potential of their most popular ‘hit’ films. While the average box office 
revenue earned by the 6445 film releases in the first run market was 44 million 
lire (at 1957 prices), around two-thirds of these releases earned less than 30 
million lire, and between them generated less than 16 per cent of total box office 
receipts. The top 6 per cent of releases, on the other hand, each earning at least 
150 million lire, accounted for around 42 per cent of total revenues. 
 
While it was not possible for firms to accurately predict, ex-ante, the extent of 
popular appeal for each picture, it was possible for them to secure extended 
screen time for hit films once the level of their popularity had been revealed 
within the first few days of release. In seeking to maximise the earning potential 
of their most popular films, the interests of distributors were eventually brought 
into conflict with first run cinema exhibitors. Both distributors and exhibitors 
benefited from the success of the most popular films, and both had an incentive 
to extend the runs of the very best performing films. The critical issue was how 
long should these runs be extended for? Demand to see even the most popular 
                                                        
72 This was a common feature of film distribution in most markets. See de Vany, Hollywood 
Economics. 
18 
 
films diminished eventually, and as the number of screening days was extended, 
the revenue generated per day inevitably began to fall. For cinema exhibitors, 
there was a strong incentive to maintain daily takings at as high a level as 
possible. This meant that once demand for a film began to wane, it needed to be 
replaced quickly by a new picture that had the potential to earn more per day 
(even if only for a short time). Distributors, on the other hand, were primarily 
concerned to maximise the revenue (and the exposure) of their leading films in 
the first run market, and their incentive was to ensure that films were screened 
for as many days as possible until their demand had been virtually exhausted. By 
examining not just the box office revenues, but also the number of screen days 
allocated to each film in the first run market, we can see which types of 
distributors (and which types of film) were most successful in obtaining an 
extended cinema release. 
 
We begin our investigation of this question by comparing the relationship 
between the box office revenues generated by, and the screen time allocated to, 
each film in our dataset. Unsurprisingly, we find a positive correlation between 
the two. We also find the relationship to be extremely strong. A simple 
correlation of box office revenue and screening days for all 6445 film releases in 
our dataset produces a positive coefficient of 0.95. This reflects the fact that both 
distributors and exhibitors had a clear incentive to expand the supply of the 
most popular films in the market at the expense of less popular pictures, and that 
the system of distribution was effective in matching supply and demand. (One 
might argue, in fact, that box office revenue was actually a predictor of screen 
days rather than vice versa). Given the strong correlation between box office 
revenue and screen days, there is clearly only limited scope for the nationality of 
a film’s distributor (or its producer) to influence the nature of this relationship. 
Wasn’t it simply the case, therefore, that the most popular films were allocated 
the longest runs, irrespective of where those films came from? Well, yes, but only 
up to a point. 
 
Figure 4: Screen time allocated to all film releases, by nationality of producer 
 
Source: Dataset 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1000000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
B
o
x 
o
ff
ic
e
 r
e
ve
n
u
e
Screen days
US Prod
ITA Prod
US Prod
ITA Prod
19 
 
Figure 4 plots the relationship between box office revenues and screen days for 
both Italian film releases and American pictures. As we would expect, there is a 
strong positive correlation in both cases (the R-squared figures are 0.95 and 
0.96). Interestingly, however, we see that the line of best fit follows a slightly 
different path in each case. Among the less popular films it is almost impossible 
to identify any difference between US and Italian releases. Towards the top end 
of the revenue distribution, however, where we find the most popular hit films, it 
appears that exhibitors did show a preference for screening Italian pictures over 
American ones. Here the two lines on the chart begin to diverge. Why should 
first-run cinema exhibitors have prioritised the screening of Italian films over 
American ones? Wasn’t it in their commercial interests to screen the most 
popular films, irrespective of their nationality? The explanation almost certainly 
lies in an incentive to book Italian films that exhibitors received  in the form of a 
tax rebate.73 The MPEAA estimated the total value of this rebate to be worth 1.3 
billion lire for all exhibitors in 1957.74 Tax breaks for exhibitors screening 
domestic films may well explain the discrepancy in screen time allocated to US 
and Italian films evidenced figure 4. With this in mind we can now focus on a 
comparison of how film distributors of different nationalities performed in the 
Italian first-run market. Figure 5, below, compares the screen time allocated to 
the American film releases handled by different distributors, while figure 6 
presents a similar comparison for Italian film releases. The trend lines shown in 
figures 5 and 6 each represent extremely strong relationships, with R squared 
values of between 0.95 and 0.98 in all cases.   
 
Figure 5: Screen time allocated to US film releases, by nationality of distributor 
 
Source: Dataset 
                                                        
73 Law n.448, Screen time quota, 29 December 1949; Law n.897, Screen time quota, 31 July 1956 
and Law n.1213, New cinema order (Nuovo ordinamento dei provvedimenti a favore della 
cinematografia), 4 November 1965. Tax rebate for exhibitors was equal to 20% of ticket levies in 
1949 and 1956 laws and was reduced to 18% of ticket levies in 1965. For discussion about these 
laws, see Quaglietti, Storia economico-politica del cinema italiano. 
74 A. Manson (on behalf of the MPEAA), Italy: Survey of the Motion Picture Market (October 
1958), p.10. In “Italy Office” 16520A, WBA. 
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The most striking feature of figure 5 is the apparent discrepancy between Italian 
and American distributors in terms of their ability to maximise screen time for 
their most popular Hollywood films. Once again, differences at the lower end of 
the revenue distribution are difficult to detect. For films which did not prove to 
be a hit with the public, access to the first-run market was quickly restricted, 
irrespective of their national origin, or that of their distributors. Among the most 
popular Hollywood releases, however, Italian distributors clearly appeared to be 
more successful than their US counterparts in extending the duration of first-run 
bookings. The biggest American hit films during our period were typically 
screened for more days in first-run venues if their distribution was handled by 
an Italian firm rather than a subsidiary of one of the US majors.  
One possible explanation for the apparent preference shown by first run 
exhibitors to Italian distributors could be that US film renters demanded higher 
rental prices than their Italian counterparts. If this was the case then exhibitors 
would have had a clear financial incentive to prioritise the screening of films in 
which they retained a higher proportion of revenues. Such an explanation, 
however, is not plausible. Negotiations between exhibitors and distributors 
regarding the split of (post-tax) box-office revenue were tightly constrained by 
industry-wide agreements between the national trade bodies representing 
distributors (ANICA) and exhibitors (AGIS). US film distributors were members 
of ANICA, and were thus bound by the same rules governing film rental contracts 
as Italian firms. There would have been very little scope for US distributors to 
routinely demand higher rental prices than Italian firms. In fact, the AGIS-ANICA 
agreements allowed scope for renters to charge higher prices for Italian films, 
which would likely have benefitted Italian distributors more than American 
ones.75 The discrepancy between Italian and American distributors in terms of 
their ability to maximise the exposure of Hollywood films in the critical first-run 
markets, can be seen as evidence of a liability of outsidership. Domestic 
distributors, being more deeply embedded within local business networks and 
enjoying closer relationships with important cinema exhibitors, were better 
placed than foreign competitors to negotiate for extended first-run bookings for 
their most popular US films. 
 
US/Italian distribution joint ventures (JVs) were also noticeably more successful 
than wholly-owned US subsidiaries in maximising the screen time of their top 
Hollywood pictures. Their performance in this regard was much closer to that of 
domestic Italian distributors than American ones. Like the wholly-owned US 
subsidiaries, the US/Italian JVs were heavily reliant on Hollywood product to fill 
their distribution portfolios. The joint ventures, however, enjoyed two important 
advantages. First, the extent of their dependence on Hollywood product was not 
as severe (21 per cent of films distributed by JVs were Italian, compared to just 
12 per cent for US distributors). Second, the JVs were better able than US 
                                                        
75 The AGIS-ANICA agreement which ran until 30 June 1961 allowed distributors to charge a 
maximum rate of 50% of net receipts for outstanding films which were not to number more than 
a quarter of its total output. But in addition to this, the 50% rate could also be charged for a 
further three Italian films per season. MPEAA Country Fact Book: Italy, 29 December 1960, “Italy 
Office” 16520A, Warner Bros. Archive, University of Southern California School of Cinematic Arts 
(WBA hereafter). 
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distributors to achieve extended first-run bookings for their most popular 
American films.  
 
Figure 6: Screen time allocated to Italian film releases, by nationality of distributor 
 
Source: Dataset 
 
If differences between Italian and American firms were clearly evident in terms 
of the distribution of Hollywood pictures, such differences were less obvious 
when it came to the handling of Italian films. As figure 6 shows, Italian 
distributors were more effective than their American counterparts in 
maximising the screen time available to the most popular Italian films, but the 
difference was smaller than that depicted in figure 5. US/Italian joint ventures, 
meanwhile, appeared to be less effective than either US or domestic distributors 
in securing extended first-run bookings for Italian films (though with only 115 
Italian films actually handled by JVs, and very few of these being hits, we are 
cautious about drawing firm conclusions about the performance of distribution 
JVs in this particular regard).  
 
The evidence from figures 5 and 6 suggests that American distribution 
subsidiaries did face a liability of outsidership relative to domestic rivals, in 
terms of their ability to maximise the exposure of their most popular films in the 
first run market. The extent of this disadvantage was more pronounced in 
relation to Hollywood films than Italian ones. Acquiring the rights to more Italian 
films was one way in which US distributors could attempt to mitigate their 
liability. The establishment of a local distribution joint venture was another. Our 
evidence shows that US distributors were more successful in marketing their 
American films when working in partnership with a local firm. Perhaps as 
importantly, however, the creation of local distribution partnerships was a 
means by which US firms could attempt to increase their access to Italian 
content.    
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Working towards insider status: partnerships with local firms 
For American film companies seeking access to the increasingly important 
Italian market in the 1960s, there were advantages to be gained from 
establishing alliances with local distributors as well as from securing the rights 
to distribute high profile Italian films. Both of these approaches can be described 
as methods by which US firms became embedded within the domestic Italian 
market, drawing on local knowledge and connections in order to improve their 
operational effectiveness. In this section we examine the different strategies 
pursued by individual US companies as they sought to achieve such objectives. 
 
The establishment of a joint venture with a local Italian distributor was perhaps 
the most obvious mechanism by which US firms could seek to improve their 
position within the Italian market. In the parlance of the international business 
literature, such a strategy allowed for the “bundling” of foreign and local assets.76 
In this case US firms provided privileged access to the output of their in-house 
studio productions (as well as other films to which they held worldwide 
distribution rights), while the local Italian distributors could potentially provide 
improved access to the Italian first run market, as well as access to domestically 
produced films. As scholars of international business have pointed out, however, 
the decision to form an international joint venture is not something that 
multinational firms can make unilaterally.77 For multinationals to combine their 
resources with those of local firms, there also needs to be an incentive for local 
firms to engage in such an alliance. In the case of the Italian film industry, the 
incentive for US multinationals to seek out joint venture partners appeared to be 
stronger than the incentive for Italian distributors to partner with US firms. For 
US firms, the benefits of a joint venture included slightly improved access to 
Italian cinema screens for their own films, as well as potentially greater access to 
domestically produced films. For Italian firms however, the main benefits of any 
such alliance would have been the right to distribute more American films, but as 
we have seen, not only were the numbers of these declining in the 1960s, it was 
far from clear that Italian distributors would have gained anything by increasing 
the proportion of American pictures within their portfolios. This is reflected in 
the fact that only two Italian distributors were involved in joint ventures during 
our period (out of a total of 59 identified in our dataset), but four US firms (out of 
a total of just seven) embarked on such a strategy. Table 3 provides information 
on the firms involved, the timing of these alliances, and the numbers of films 
released. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
76 For example, Verbeke et al. ‘New policy challenges for European multinationals’ in New Policy, 
eds. Van Tulder et al. 
77 Hennart, “Down with MNE-Centric Theories!”. 
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Table 3: Films distributed in Italy by Italian-American joint ventures, 1957-1970 
Year Total films  CEIAD-
Columbia  
Dear-
United 
Artists  
Dear-Fox Dear-Int’l 
Warner 
Bros. 
      
1957 43 43 0 0 0 
1958 32 32 0 0 0 
1959 26 26 0 0 0 
1960 25 25 0 0 0 
1961 26 26 0 0 0 
1962 28 20 4 4 0 
1963 75 25 28 22 0 
1964 65 19 22 24 0 
1965 71 26 23 22 0 
1966 78 29 27 22 0 
1967 79 25 31 23 0 
1968 67 25 38 0 4 
1969 68 18 31 0 19 
1970 46 18 28 0 0 
Total 729 357 232 117 23 
Source: Dataset  
 
The two most enduring joint ventures were those between CEIAD-Columbia and 
DEAR-United Artists. In both cases the agreements served to strengthen pre-
existing relationships that dated back a number of years.78 With the re-opening 
of the Italian market after the Second World War, Columbia chose not to re-
establish distribution offices in Italy, but rather to distribute its pictures through 
CEIAD (Cinematografica Edizioni Internazionali Artistiche Distribuzione). Having 
acted as the exclusive distributor of Columbia films in Italy for a decade, CEIAD 
entered into joint distribution with its long standing American partner in the 
mid-1950s, and as we see from table 3, the relationship was still going strong in 
the 1970s. United Artists had ceased direct distribution of its films in Italy in 
1932, and in the post-war years distributed in Italy exclusively through DEAR 
(Distribuzione Edizioni Associate Rizzoli), and its predecessor firm DAI 
(Distribuzione Associata Internazionale). As we see from table 3, the exclusive 
distribution agreement was developed into a joint venture in 1962, and as with 
the CEIAD-Columbia partnership, this lasted into the 1970s. 
 
The year 1962 also saw DEAR enter into a joint venture with Twentieth Century-
Fox. Rather than building on an established relationship however, this 
agreement marked a strategic decision on the part of Fox to distribute in 
partnership with a local firm rather than operating through a wholly owned 
subsidiary – which had been always previously their mode of operation in Italy. 
The joint venture was not a complete merger of the two firms’ distribution 
businesses in Italy, as DEAR maintained a separate joint venture with United 
Artists, and when the partnership broke down in 1967 Fox resumed direct 
distribution of its own pictures in Italy. Following the termination of the 
partnership with Fox, DEAR entered into a similar arrangement with Warner 
Bros., although this was even shorter lived.  
                                                        
78 Annuario del cinema italiano e audiovisivi 1953-1957. 
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Correspondence files in the Warner Bros. archive reveal that this American firm 
had been in discussion with several leading Italian distributors regarding the 
pooling of distribution operations in the early 1960s. Following the collapse of 
an agreement with the producer-distributor Dino De Laurentis, which had got as 
far as receiving approval from the Warner Bros. Board of Directors, the company 
embarked on detailed negotiations to reach a similar arrangement with the 
distributor Euro International in April 1963.79 Euro, according to Warners’ 
Italian manager, had also previously been in discussion with Twentieth Century-
Fox and Universal.80 The available archival evidence, therefore, would appear to 
suggest a considerable interest on the part of US distributors in aligning their 
Italian distribution operations with local firms, even if many of the proposed 
alliances never made it to completion. 
 
Clearly not all US firms were able to establish joint distribution arrangements 
with domestic Italian companies, and where such agreements were reached, 
some were more durable than others. Even where US firms operated through 
wholly owned subsidiaries, however, it was still possible for those subsidiaries 
to acquire the distribution rights of Italian films. Warner Bros., for example, had 
an agreement to distribute the films of the Italian producer Galatea Pictures in 
the early 1960s, while Paramount made agreements of this type with some of the 
major Italian producer-distributors such as Lux and Dino De Laurentiis at 
various points during our period. The incentive for Italian producers to enter 
into such agreements was the potential for improved international distribution 
of their pictures. Table 4 shows which US firms were most successful in securing 
the distribution rights to domestically produced films in the Italian market. 
 
While the distribution portfolios of all US firms were dominated by American 
productions, we do see some quite significant differences between these 
companies in the extent to which they handled domestic product. Paramount 
and Warner Bros. each distributed 55 Italian films during the period, whereas 
Universal released just six. Paramount’s agreements with Lux81 and, more 
importantly, Dino De Laurentis meant that a significant proportion of the Italian 
films it distributed were high profile productions with box office earnings that 
placed them in the top revenue category. Fewer than one in five of the films 
released by Paramount were Italian productions, yet these constituted almost 
two-fifths of its highest earning films. Of all the Italian films released by US 
distributors that made it into the top revenue category, half were distributed by 
Paramount (and none by Fox or Universal). Paramount and Universal merged 
their international distribution businesses in 1970, and the resulting 
organisation, Cinema International Corporation (CIC), was responsible for the 
release of several more high profile Italian films in 1970 and 1971. Both MGM 
and Warner Bros were able to secure distribution of similar numbers of Italian 
films as Paramount, but the vast majority of these pictures fell into the lower 
revenue categories. 
                                                        
79 Greenberg to Orlandi, 5 April 1963, “Italy Office” 16520B, WBA. 
80 Orlandi to Abeles, 27 March 1963, “Italy Office” 16520B, WBA. 
81 “Il primo congresso Paramount dopo la fusione Lux-Paramount”, in Giornale dello Spettacolo, 
July 1st 1962.  
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Table 4: Breakdown of films released in the Italian first run market by American 
distributors, 1957-71  
 Highest earning 
films 
>L.150million 
All films 
20th Century-Fox   
US productions 13 185 
ITA/US productions  0 1 
ITA productions 0 9 
Other foreign productions 1 23 
CIC   
US productions 4 27 
ITA/US productions  0 1 
ITA productions 4 8 
Other foreign productions 0 0 
MGM   
US productions 19 317 
ITA/US productions  5 10 
ITA productions 2 40 
Other foreign productions 0 28 
Paramount   
US productions 16 218 
ITA/US productions  0 0 
ITA productions 10 55 
Other foreign productions 2 21 
Universal   
US productions 20 241 
ITA/US productions  1 1 
ITA productions 0 6 
Other foreign productions 1 15 
Warner Bros.   
US productions 19 201 
ITA/US productions  0 0 
ITA productions 4 55 
Other foreign productions 0 19 
   
Source: Dataset 
 
If Paramount was able to distinguish itself in the Italian market by securing 
access to high profile films by leading domestic producers, MGM was more active 
than other US firms in co-producing with Italian companies.  Of all the films 
released in Italy by US distributors in this period, just 13 were Italian-American 
co-productions, and of these no less than 10 were distributed by MGM. As we 
have already noted, these American-Italian collaborations were often highly 
popular with Italian audiences, and half of MGM’s local co-productions made it 
into the highest revenue bracket. Both Paramount and MGM, through their 
agreements with domestic film producers in Italy, were thus able to construct 
film portfolios which contained a significant proportion of content with a distinct 
local flavour. 
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Table 5: Breakdown of films released in the Italian first run market by Italian-
American distributors, 1957-71  
 Highest earning 
films 
>L.150million 
All films 
CEIAD-Columbia   
US productions 20 233 
ITA/US productions  1 4 
ITA productions 8 54 
Other foreign productions 0 65 
DEAR-United Artists   
US productions 15 147 
ITA/US productions  2 5 
ITA productions 2 27 
Other foreign productions 8 52 
DEAR-Fox   
US productions 8 69 
ITA/US productions  0 0 
ITA productions 2 27 
Other foreign productions 0 21 
DEAR-Warner Bros.   
US productions 1 15 
ITA/US productions  0 0 
ITA productions 1 7 
Other foreign productions 0 2 
   
Source: Dataset 
 
The distribution joint-ventures between US and Italian firms were also able to 
offer Italian exhibitors a mixed portfolio of films. As we see from table 5, CEIAD-
Columbia was comparable with Paramount, both in terms of the volume of 
Italian films it distributed, and the proportion that fell into the top box-office 
revenue category. DEAR-United Artists distributed fewer high profile Italian 
films, but it was able to supplement these with the occasional Italian-US co-
production, as well as a much more regular supply of popular films from other 
parts of the world (including the series of James Bond movies).82 The DEAR-Fox 
joint venture provides an interesting comparison with Twentieth Century-Fox’s 
direct distribution practices. The joint venture was operational for only 5 full 
years (out of 14) and therefore handled fewer films than Fox’s wholly owned 
subsidiary, yet it released three times the number of Italian productions. 
However, it is not apparent that this access to Italian pictures did much to boost 
the American distributor’s fortunes. Ten per cent of the US films handled by 
DEAR-Fox fell into the top revenue category, yet the figure for its Italian films 
was just 7 per cent. This may provide part of the reason why Twentieth Century-
Fox reverted to direct distribution towards the end of the 1960s.  
 
                                                        
82 Of the twenty highest earning film releases in our dataset, three were from the James Bond 
franchise: Thunderball (1965), Goldfinger (1964) and You Only Live Twice (1967). 
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Working towards insider status: the activities of distribution subsidiaries 
Entering into agreements with local film producers or distributors was clearly an 
attractive strategic option for US film companies in Italy. Deals with local 
production companies enabled firms like Paramount to offer audiences a regular 
supply of popular Italian-made films, and for MGM to release a series of Italian-
American productions. Distribution joint ventures involving Columbia and 
United Artists allowed these companies to maximise the exposure of their top 
earning films in the Italian market. But how did such alliances come about? It is 
one thing to recognise a commercial incentive for partnering with local firms, but 
pursuing such a strategy effectively requires an intimate understanding of local 
business practices and a high degree of integration within local business 
networks. To borrow a concept from the strategic management literature, 
subsidiary firms need to possess “absorptive capacity” if they are to benefit from 
access to local knowledge or network connections.83 How then, did the 
distribution offices of US firms actually operate in practice? 
 
The first observation we can make about the running of American distribution 
subsidiaries in Italy is that they were typically headed by local Italian managers. 
A survey of the ‘industry personnel’ pages of the Film Daily Yearbook provides 
the names of these managers, many of whom held their positions for long 
periods. The head of Paramount’s Italian operations in the 1960s was Pilade 
Levi, who had occupied this post since the late 1940s. Mario Zama, who had 
managed Warner Bros. distribution in Italy in the mid-1930s was still doing the 
same job twenty years later. Another Zama (Emanuele) headed Universal’s 
Italian subsidiary from the 1940s until around 1960. The pages of the trade 
directories indicate that US firms did not rotate managers between different 
national territories. Managers appear to have been locally recruited and typically 
remained in Italy throughout their career. The trade directories do, however, 
offer some evidence that Italian managers occasionally moved between firms. 
When setting up their joint venture with Dear in 1962, for example, United 
Artists recruited the head of MGM’s Italian subsidiary to lead the new 
enterprise.84 If US companies relied on local managers to run their Italian 
distribution offices, what was it that these managers did? What was the nature of 
their local knowledge, and how did they put it to use in the service of their 
American employers? 
 
The distribution records held within the Warner Bros. archive provide a valuable 
insight into the routine functioning of foreign distribution subsidiaries in the 
1950s and 1960s. The head of Warner’s Italian distribution for much of this 
period was Umberto Orlandi, and extensive correspondence between Orlandi 
and his superiors in New York has survived. These records point to four broad 
areas in which the company drew on the local knowledge of its Italian manager. 
In each case it would be difficult to imagine an American expatriate being easily 
able to perform an equivalent role. 
 
                                                        
83 Cohen, Levinthal, “Absorptive capacity”. 
84 Film Daily Yearbook, multiple years. 
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The first of these areas was Orlandi’s accumulated knowledge of local audience 
tastes and preferences. One of the tasks of local distribution subsidiaries was to 
supply head office with estimates for final gross billings for all pictures, and to 
update these estimates regularly as films progressed through their distribution 
runs. (Failure to do this would result in a firm rebuke from the Group 
Treasurer).85 By closely following audience responses, managers like Orlandi 
developed a keen sense of market trends and were well placed to recommend 
which films would be most suitable for release in the Italian market, and to 
develop appropriate release strategies. Warner’s decision not to acquire 
distribution rights to the 1960 film Carthage in Flames (dir. Carmine Gallone) 
was taken on Orlandi’s advice that “the picture has not got the quality that 
warrants this type of investment.”86 In cases where distribution deals for Italian 
pictures were agreed, Orlandi also made recommendations as to whether 
Warner Bros. should also seek international distribution rights.87 As well as 
casting judgement on the likely popular appeal of Italian pictures, Orlandi could 
also influence the marketing of American films. In the case of the 1961 drama 
Fanny (dir. Josh Logan) he warned against releasing the film under this title in 
the light of the poor reception of an earlier Italian production of the same 
name.88  Foreign distributors that lacked detailed local knowledge were at risk of 
committing quite serious blunders in the marketing of locally produced films. At 
one private screening of preliminary footage for a forthcoming film, for example, 
foreign distributors raised questions about dubbing – not realising that the 
actors were speaking in a widely understood Roman dialect.89 
 
It was not just Orlandi’s knowledge of local audience preferences that was 
sought by his head office superiors, but his understanding of local regulations 
and their interpretation. He often fielded requests from New York executives 
seeking clarity on very specific questions relating to matters such as dubbing 
policy, or the necessity of producing certificates of nationality for individual 
films.90 Without the ability to obtain quick answers to routine questions such as 
these, the operational efficiency of US distributors would have been greatly 
undermined. 
 
A third area where the knowledge and expertise of local managers was essential 
was in conducting negotiations with other domestic firms. It was Orlandi, for 
example, who led negotiations with Dino del Laurentis and Euro International 
about potential distribution joint ventures. While decisions about whether to go 
ahead with such deals were taken at a higher level, senior executives in New 
York were heavily reliant on Orlandi’s own accounts of the negotiations in 
reaching their judgements.91 While major strategic decisions such as the creation 
of a new distribution partnership were closely monitored by the New York head 
                                                        
85 O’Sullivan to Orlandi, 15 August 1961, Box 16613B, WBA. 
86 Cohen to Orlandi, 25 August 1959, Box 16519A, WBA. 
87 ‘Italy – Co-Production Deals’, 10 January 1958, Box 16519A, WBA. 
88 Cohen to Abeles, 18 August 1961, Box 16613B, WBA. 
89 Della Casa, de Hadeln, Capitani coraggiosi: produttori italiani 1945-1975, p. 197. 
90 Greenberg to Orlandi, 19 August 1963; Greenberg to Orlandi, 6 March 1961, Box 16519A, WBA. 
91 Orlandi to Abeles, 27 March 1963, 11 April 1963, 19 April 1963, Box 16520B, WBA. 
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office, Orlandi had considerably more leeway when negotiating with Italian 
producers about distribution rights to individual films.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Italian managers provided US firms not 
just with access to local knowledge, but also to local networks. Orlandi, for 
example, was a prominent member of the Italian distributors organisation 
ANICA. In the late 1950s he played an important role in discussions between 
ANICA and the body representing film exhibitors (AGIS) about the organisation 
of distribution practices in Italy, well before any proposals were put to the 
managers of other American firms.92 Perhaps the clearest evidence of how 
Orlandi sought to build and strengthen his informal ties with key figures in the 
Italian industry comes from frequent requests to head office to authorise 
payment of irregular expenditures. Here is a typical example from December 
1954: 
“In the course of our daily struggle to obtain censorship, visas, 
importation and exportation permits as well as deblockments, we have 
received many favours from some gentlemen whose names you know 
through our correspondence and from whom we expect even more help 
in the future, so that we cannot let the approaching holidays pass without 
presenting them with some substantial gift. I therefore am asking your 
kind authorisation to spend for this purpose the following sums: 
L.100,000 – Dr. Gianni de Tommasi, Censorship 
L.100,000 – Dr. Tommaso Rosa, Ministry of Foreign Trade – 
deblockments, importation, exportation. 
L.70,000 – Dr. Benito Orta, Presidency of the Council, importation and 
exportation. 
I am sure you will understand my necessity in this matter for which I am 
counting on your warm helping hand.”93 
 
In the same year Orlandi requested (and was granted) permission to spend 
L.50,000 on a wedding present for the daughter of a prominent exhibitor in 
Genoa who at the time held the presidency of AGIS.94 Similar requests were 
made (and granted) to contribute to wedding celebrations, obituary notices or 
Christmas gifts for a range of figures in the industry (usually prominent 
exhibitors) with the amount of expenditure broadly reflecting the importance of 
the individual involved.95 Occasionally requests were made in the other 
direction, as when an important New York exhibitor visited Rome with his wife 
to celebrate their wedding anniversary. On this occasion Orlandi was asked to 
“extend to Mr. Frisch and his wife the usual courtesies.”96 While the practice of 
keeping on good terms with important industry partners would have been 
widespread across different business cultures, the way in which this was done 
                                                        
92 Orlandi to Hummel, 18 January 1957; Copy of letter dated 24 January 1957 from 
MPEAA/Rome, Box 16519A, WBA. 
93 Orlandi to Hummel, 14 December 1954, Box 16682B, WBA. 
94 Orlandi to Holenstein, 24 May 1954, Box 16682B, WBA. 
95 Orlandi to Holenstein, 19 September 1958; Orlandi to Greenberg, 26 September 1961, Box 
16682B, WBA. 
96 The ‘usual courtesies’ would have involved the sort of hospitality that was extended to visiting 
film stars, such as delivery of a bouquet of flowers to their hotel, and use of a company car. See 
O’Sullivan to Orlandi, 3 August 1961, Box 16681B, WBA. 
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clearly varied between countries where different institutions or “rules of the 
game” were in place. Institutional weaknesses have been identified as a key 
factor shaping the evolution of the Italian economy since unification, in 
particular the limited development of big business.97 Scholars have also pointed 
to inefficient institutions as part of “a wider picture of regulatory failure that 
may incentivise borderline, if not illegal, behaviours”.98 Among advanced 
industrialised countries, Italy has been among the most susceptible to 
encroachment from the so-called “shadow economy”.99 As far as the cinema 
industry was concerned, informal ties have always played an important role and 
gift practices appear to have been quite common.100  Local managers in Italy, 
already embedded within informal networks and familiar with local business 
practices, were much better placed than expatriates to work towards a position 
of “insidership” within this business community.  
 
Conclusions 
While the cultural impact of Hollywood entertainment on post-war Italian film 
audiences has been the subject of detailed historical investigation,101 this article 
has been the first to examine how American film distributors adapted to the 
Italian market. Italy, by the 1960s, constituted one of the largest motion picture 
markets outside the United States, and thus accounted for a significant 
proportion of Hollywood’s foreign earnings. This was at a time when US 
domestic cinema attendance was in decline and foreign markets were an 
increasingly important source of revenue for American distributors. The article 
has sought to demonstrate that as well as being an important market for US film 
distributors, it was also a highly competitive one. The market share held by 
American films declined throughout the period in the face of a resurgent Italian 
production sector, and while some Hollywood films continued to hold a strong 
popular appeal, these were outnumbered by popular Italian pictures for most of 
the 1960s. As such, there was every incentive for US firms to take on a distinctly 
more Italian character if they were to succeed in this valuable market. 
 
But what did localisation actually involve for American film distributors? Was it 
enough for these firms simply to offer products that could be perceived as local 
by Italian audiences (i.e. acquire distribution rights to more Italian films); or did 
they genuinely need to think and behave like Italian firms in order to integrate 
into local business networks? Our investigation finds that both were important. 
Italian films accounted for a growing share of box office revenues throughout the 
period, and so access to these films was important if US distributors were to 
maintain their market position. Moreover, there were fiscal incentives for Italian 
                                                        
97 Colli, Rinaldi, “Institutions, Politics and the Corporate Economy”. 
98 Di Martino, Vasta, “Happy 150th Anniversary Italy?”, 294. 
99 Schneider, Enste, “Shadow Economies”, 80. 
100 Archival evidence of such practices is not easy to be found and most of these anecdotes belong 
to oral narratives. During the 1930s a quite common practice was the request for free cinema 
tickets or free cinema subscriptions made by prominent individuals (politicians or bank 
managers) to Italian exhibitors. See Nicoli, Non arte, ma scarpe, 248-9. Another typical practice 
was to recommend people for working in the technical or artistic cast in return of financing 
promises. For other anecdotes see Sanguineti, Il cervello di Alberto Sordi. Rodolfo Sonego e il suo 
cinema; Della Casa, Splendor. Storia (inconsueta) del cinema italiano.  
101 Gennari, Post-War Italian Cinema; Faldini, Fofi, L’avventurosa storia del cinema italiano. 
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exhibitors to preference the screening of domestic films over foreign ones, so 
distributors handling mainly foreign product were at a disadvantage. Our data 
also show, however, that US distributors were less effective than Italian ones in 
extending the screen time available to the most popular Hollywood pictures. The 
problem facing American distributors was not simply that their Hollywood 
product was seen as ‘foreign’ by Italian audiences who rejected it in favour of 
something more to their taste. Rather, it was one of persuading first run cinema 
exhibitors to allow the most popular of their films extended screen runs. We can, 
therefore, identify two distinct aspects to the localisation strategies being 
pursued by US distributors. The first can be thought of as a classic business-to-
consumer marketing strategy, whereby US firms sought access to more locally 
produced content that Italian audiences would not necessarily identify as 
American. The second involved business-to-business interactions between US 
distributors and local contacts, in which American firms needed to demonstrate 
a much deeper understanding of local business systems and practices. 
 
Different US firms responded to the first of these challenges in different ways. 
Paramount was particularly effective in reaching agreements with leading Italian 
producers, providing it with the right to distribute a number of popular Italian 
films. MGM was more notable for its engagement in joint productions with 
established Italian producers, enabling it to secure distribution rights to some of 
the most popular Italian-American films of the period. Columbia and United 
Artists pursued an alternative path of establishing distribution joint ventures 
with local firms (a strategy also briefly followed by Twentieth Century-Fox and 
Warner Bros.)  
 
In order to explore the second, and more complex, aspect of localisation the 
article has delved deeper into corporate archives to shine a light on the more 
routine operational practices of their Italian distribution subsidiaries. Here we 
arrive at the “front line” at which American firms engaged most directly with the 
domestic Italian cinema industry. The staff working in these offices might be 
thought of as the “foot soldiers” of Americanization – but our evidence suggests 
that that their role was as much one of educating New York executives about the 
daily realities of the local business environment as it was about spreading the 
influence of the American way of life. Certainly, without the detailed knowledge 
of these local Italian managers, and access to their networks of local business 
contacts, it would have been difficult for American firms to build the sorts of 
relationships with local producers or distributors on which their localisation 
strategies were based. The closer we get to the mundane operational realities of 
these American firms in Italy, the more clearly can we see their attempts to 
leverage relationships and contacts to embed themselves in the local market. We 
do not claim that US distribution subsidiaries fully succeeded in achieving 
insider status in the Italian film industry of the 1960s, but our evidence shows 
that in this post-studio era these American firms found it necessary to work 
towards such a goal.  
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